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I. INTRODUCTION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
CONTROVERSIAL MARKETS 
It was made clear long ago that property and value are different 
things. Value exists. It is a fact. 1 It can arise from law, and much of 
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1. The distinction between "is" and "ought" is too ancient to have a birthday. A primary 
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law aims at creating more value in the world. But value can also arise 
in spite of law (consider, for example, the fortunes that bootleggers 
made during the Roaring 1\venties ), or in law's interstices. 
When a particular value arises despite a lack of explicit legal 
protection, its possessors often ask courts or legislatures to give them 
a legal entitlement to preserve and further exploit that value. 
Typically the holders demand (1) a liberty to employ the valued thing; 
(2) a right to exclude others from using it;2 and (3) a power to 
transfer the rights of exclusion and liberties of use to a market buyer. 
Taken together, these three entitlements-to use, to exclude, and to 
alienate-are recognizable as property.3 
The law of intellectual property and unfair competition must 
continually decide which valuable things and behaviors should be 
subject to private control, and whether that control should take the 
form of "property." Such decisions are not necessary with regard only 
to newly developed technologies. Courts are called upon to make 
similar decisions about long-established media, including books. For 
example, copyright courts often must decide whether the "fair use" 
doctrine justifies or excuses a prima facie violation of a copyright 
owner's exclusive right-an open-ended inquiry that boils down to a 
determination that the contested use is or is not subject to the owner's 
property right. Sometimes "fair use" treatment is justified by a finding 
that no market is available to exploit the contested use, but 
sometimes copyright courts seem to distrust the market even when 
available. This raises the issue of when and why the market should be 
distrusted. 
Similarly, a copyright court often must identify an author's "ideas," 
in which no copyright subsists, and distinguish them from the author's 
"expression," in which copyright can be owned.4 But what is an idea 
and where is the dividing line between idea and expression? 
Presumably, to decide how the law should define "idea," we would 
illustration in the intellectual property area appears in the case of International News Service v. 
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), where a majority of the Supreme Court used its pre-Erie 
common law and equitable powers to create a "quasi-property" right in the news. Justice 
Holmes had strong doubts about the wisdom of the majority approach. In a separate and crucial 
opinion, he emphasized that "[p]roperty [is] a creation of law [and] does not arise from value, 
although exchangeable-a matter of fact." Id. at 246 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
2. As Holmes wrote: "Many exchangeable values may be destroyed intentionally without 
compensation. Property depends upon exclusion by law from interference ... . "Id. at 248. 
3. For a more formal examination of the Hohfeldian categories and their economic sig-
nificance in the intellectual property context, see Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits 
of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 1343, 1354-94 (1989) [hereinafter Gordon, Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright]. 
4. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (providing that "[i]n no case does copyright protection for 
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, ... concept, principle, or discovery, regardless 
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work"). 
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have to know (among other things) what purpose is served by denying 
property status to ideas. On that question, many hypotheses have 
been suggested. Some theories are undoubtedly correct-such as the 
suggestion, intimated in a different connection by John Dawson,5 that 
fundamental building blocks like "ideas" may contribute so much to 
so many people that giving ownership in those fundamentals would 
cause impossible problems of tracing. But no existing account is 
comprehensive. For example, even for an idea whose genesis and 
effect could be traced, something in us, perhaps indebted to the First 
Amendment, rebels against the notion of one person being able to 
control how that idea is used. 
A related question is whether facts should be owned. The Supreme 
Court recently ruled that copyright law could not protect raw data,6 
but the possibility remains that Congress7 or the courts8 might make 
data ownable by means other than traditional copyright. Is this a good 
idea? Although data is bought and sold, information is also the stuff 
of the First Amendment. 
The courts have not been of much help recently in addressing these 
issues, or in addressing the underlying question about the proper 
scope of the market. Too often, judicial decisions have stretched 
existing doctrines to grant property rights without any clear reason. 
The result is often confusion. One circuit protects raw trade symbols;9 
another does not.10 One circuit uses California law to protect a 
famous singer's rendition of a song from commercial imitation;11 
other circuits would undoubtedly hold such state protection preempt-
ed as inconsistent with federal copyright law.12 Some courts eagerly 
protect data through the unfair-competition tort of misappropria-
5. See infra note 104 and accompanying text. 
6. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
7. See Jane C. Ginsburg, No "Sweat"?: Copyright and Other Protection of Works of 
Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992) (urging congressional 
action and defending its legitimacy). 
8. See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, On Owning Information]. For a 
discussion of whether such state-based protection would be preempted, see id. at 155 n.22. 
9. See Boston Profl Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th 
Cir.) (permitting hockey teams to enjoin the sale of cloth National Hockey League team emblem 
replicas), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975). 
10. See International Order of Job's Daughters v. Llndeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 
1980) (denying an injunction to a fraternal organization seeking to enjoin "unofficial" jewelers 
from malting and selling jewelry embodying the club's emblem), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 941 
(1981). 
11. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988), cen. denied sub nom. Young 
& Rubican, Inc. v. Midler, 503 U.S. 951 (1992). · 
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1994) (providing that "[t]he exclusive rights of the owner of 
copyright in a sound recording ... do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound 
recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such 
sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording"). 
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tion;13 others interpret the tort narrowly;14 while the authors of the 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition recommend that a 
freestanding tort of misappropriation not be recognized at all.15 But 
amidst the chaos, the trend seems to be pro-plaintiff and pro-private 
property. In a kind of misappropriation explosion, new intellectual 
property rights are continually granted, and the public domain 
continually cut back. 
Many of the property right expansions are Congress's doing. 
Realpolitik may explain Congress's behavior-after all, possessing 
value often leads to possessing power as well.16 But why is it that so 
many courts are also creating new and doubtfully justified rights on 
their own? Do the judges think that value is property and must be 
protected as such? Let us hope not, since that is ancient error.17 
What else, then, might explain the ever increasing spread of intellectu-
al property rights? And is it a defensible principle that can guide 
exploration of the as-yet-unresolved issues? 
A promising place to seek some answers to these and related 
questions is in two recent books: James Boyle's Shamans, Software, 
and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society,18 
and Margaret Jane Radin's Contested Commodities.19 Boyle promises 
to tell us about intellectual property. Radin promises to enlighten us 
regarding what resources or values-such as body parts, sexual 
services, or babies-should enter the market. Between them, Boyle 
and Radin may tell us something about which kinds of intangibles, 
and which kinds of behaviors regarding intangibles, should be subject 
to the regime of private property, and which better belong outside the 
market.20 
13. See Board of Trade v. Dow Jones Co., 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983). 
14. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 38 cmt. b (1995) (suggesting 
that misappropriation only be recognized as a part of an otherwise established right, as is created 
by trade secret law, and that the "better approach" is that the states should refuse to "recognize 
a residual common law tort of misappropriation"). 
16. The problems with such translation of value from the monetary to the political sphere 
are part of the focus of Michael Walzer's Spheres of Justice. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES 
OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983) (arguing that to preserve 
equality, societal sources of value must be pluralist); see also infra notes 53-54 and accompanying 
text. 
17. See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CO LUM. 
L. REV. 809, 814-17 (1935) (criticizing the elevation of value as a source of property rights). For 
a discussion linking the "value as property" notion to a primitive conception of corrective justice, 
and criticizing both, see Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 8, at 166-95. Value as 
"property" can also be viewed through the lens of restitution. See id. See generally Wendy J. 
Gordon, Of Hanns and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 
449 (1992). 
18. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFIWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996). 
19. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996). 
20. The two books also represent two potentially complementary perspectives. Boyle is 
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Both books provide partial answers. Boyle suggests that some 
judges are drawn to granting new rights by a "myth of authorship."21 
This is more comprehensible than the notion "value is property" as 
an explanation for recent developments. Notions of "authorship" can 
be unpacked and critically analyzed in ways that a simple preference 
for status quo "value" might not.22 As for Radin, she demands that 
our property institutions take explicit account of human flourishing. 
In so doing, she indirectly contributes to our understanding of why 
ideas are not owned, and of how to identify what should be the 
contours of "idea" or "fair use."23 
Neither book, taken separately or together, fully tells us which 
intangibles are suitable for trading and in what context. For Radin, 
this is no failure. Not only is her focus not intellectual property, but 
her goal is a modest though important one: to make vivid the 
importance of noneconomic ways of viewing persons and legal 
institutions. Therefore it is natural that she would only partially 
enhance our understanding of a field (intellectual property) whose 
underpinnings are highly economic. Boyle's endeavor to provide a 
theory of the. information society, however, is more significantly 
incomplete. Nevertheless, he teaches much: His entertaining book 
diagnoses problems with the current system in a way that can only 
help the profession deal with intellectual property's challenges. 
This Book Review will summarize Boyle's and Radin's key ar-
guments. Each book makes a significant contribution, and it is hoped 
the summary will make those contributions more accessible to 
readers. The Review will then turn to intellectual property, and to the 
question of markets in cyberspace. "Cyberspace" is, of course, what 
we know more casually as "the Web" or "the Net,"24 that intangible 
electronic domain from which the American public may soon be able 
to download everything from music and movies to software and 
secrets.25 Because the Net's computer links have the potential to 
reduce transaction costs considerably, cyberspace poses a particular 
challenge to those intellectual property doctrines, such as "fair use" 
preoccupied with issues of reward. His book's primary point is that "authors" are rewarded too 
much, and "sources" are rewarded too little. Radin is preoccupied with issues of need. 
21. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. 
22. See Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 8, at 178-80. 
23. See infra notes 85-108 and accompanying text. 
24. For a discussion of the technical and historical distinctions between "Net" and "Web," 
see Maureen O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Vinual World, 82 MINN. L. 
REV. (forthcoming Feb. 1998). 
25. Cyberspace would be an appropriate topic for both Boyle and Radin. As for Boyle, the 
Net's stock in trade is his subject matter, namely, information. As for Radin, the Net is currently 
making a transition from an informal and open domain governed by "Netiquette" to something 
else-perhaps a set of mini-domains governed by property rules. To examine aspects of this 
transition there are few tools as useful as Radin's examination of the limits of market control. 
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in copyright law, that have been aimed in part at circumventing 
transaction cost barriers.26 With Boyle and Radin we can deepen our 
understanding of the many forces other than transaction costs that 
shape (or should shape) intellectual property boundaries. 
II. BOYLE 
As the "death of authorship" gradually took over grove after grove 
of literary academe, a related cottage industry set itself up in the field 
of copyright.27 In some ways this was surprising. After all, First 
Amendment and copyright lawyers hardly needed Foucault28 to tell 
them that the legal conception of "authorship" worked to constrain 
meaning. Generations of scholars in the United States have tried to 
liberate new authors from obeisance to old ones.29 That American 
26. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter 
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure] (examining reasons for fair use including and going beyond 
the transaction cost barriers that can prevent market formation). 
27. See, e.g., nm CONSTRUCTION OF AUIBORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND 
LITERATURE (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994); JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED 
CULTURE: nm IMAGE, TIIE VOICE, AND TIIE LAW (1991 ); OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS: ESSAYS 
ON COPYRIGHT LAW (Brad Sherman & Alain Strowe) eds., 1994); MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND 
OWNERS: nm INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993); MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUIBOR, 
ART, AND TIIE MARKET: REREADING TIIE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS (1994); Rosemary J. 
Coombe, Challenging Paternity: Histories of Copyright, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 397 (1994) (book 
review). For instructive criticism of the poststructuralist tum in copyright scholarship, see DA YID 
SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT (1992). 
28. Foucault argued, inter alia, that "authorship" is a cultural construct that makes it possible 
for some central source to constrain variations in meaning. See Michel Foucault, What ls an 
Author?, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES: PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCWRALIST CRITICISM 141, 158-
59 (Josu~ V. Harari ed., 1979). He writes: "[T]he author is not an indefinite source of 
significations which fill a work . . . . [H]e is a certain functional principle by which, in our 
culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in short, by which one impedes the free circulation, 
the free manipulation, the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction." Id. 
at 159. To the extent that copyright law gives "authors" rights to control hostile uses of their 
works, Foucault does no more than state the truth. However, in the United States-unlike, 
apparently, in France (Foucault's home)-authors usually are not allowed to constrain meaning. 
In fact, one of the primary purposes of the "fair use" defense in the U.S. is to disable authors 
from employing copyright law in the service of private censorship. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, 
On the Economics of Copyright, Restitution, and "Fair Use": Systemic Versus Case-by-Case 
Responses to Market Failure, 8 J.L. & INFO. SCI. 7 (1997) (examining private censorship as a 
form of market failure) [hereinafter Gordon, On the Economics of Copyright]; Wendy J. 
Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of 
Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1041-46 (1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Toward a 
Jurisprudence of Benefits] (reviewing PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND 
PRACTICE (1989), and discussing private censorship, fair use, and market failure). 
29. See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the 
Protection of Expression, 67 CAL L. REv. 283 (1979); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Expressive 
Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397 
(1990); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); 
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural 
Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1591-95, 1601-06 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, 
Property Right in Self-Expression]; Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 
55 LA w & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, Reality as Artifact]; Gordon, 
Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 28, at 1032-49 (discussing "private censorship"); 
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courts have only sometimes shared this goal should not obscure the 
fact that sometimes they embrace it. For example, under either 
copyright law or the ill-named doctrine of "moral rights," many 
nations forbid the parodic use of established copyrighted texts, but 
U.S. courts are hospitable to parody.30 
Thus, the voice of the authorial iconoclast, calling into question the 
meaning of established canons, has long provided the primary energy 
that empowers both First Amendment and related intellectual 
property scholarship.31 Fighting against authorial constraint is a time-
honored American tradition, if only sporadically recognized by the 
courts. As a result, it is doubtful that many members of the copyright 
bar took the "death of the author" literature seriously.32 
Then James Boyle's Shamans, Software, and Spleens came along. It 
persuades that the authorial myth has, in fact, sometimes usurped the 
iconoclast myth in shaping our law. In so doing, Boyle's book shakes 
up some of the copyright bar's self-congratulation regarding its free 
speech successes.33 
Boyle's book, however, also fails to do much that it promises. It 
claims to deliver an account of the information society, but does not. 
It claims to bring the economics of information crashing down around 
its proponents' ears, but fails.34 Nevertheless the book does indeed 
do its central task well: It warns us that a piece of rhetoric and 
romance may be taking our nation to a place where historically 
generated illusions are fogging the prospects needed for new growth. 
This, Boyle's strongest and central argument, essentially passes 
through three stages. First, he shows us that information is a category 
to which the current law has no stable response, and he diagnoses the 
David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981); Jessica 
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, 
Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 V AND. L. REV. 1 (1987); L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, 
Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory 
Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REv. 719 (1989); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing 
First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836 
(1983); Diane L. Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on 
Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992). 
30. Compare, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) (parodist can be 
an appropriate beneficiary of the "fair use" defense), with Cie Generale des Etablissements 
Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. C.A.W.-Canada, 71 C.P.R.3d 348, 381 (Can. Fed. Ct. 1996) 
("[P]arody does not exist as a facet of 'criticism,' an exception to infringement in Canadian 
copyright Jaw."). 
31. See, e.g., STEVEN H. SIIlFFRIN, THE FlRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 
(1990) (explaining the importance that First Amendment Jaw places on the iconoclast). 
32. See Michael Spence, Book Review, 46 REV. ENG. STUD. 610 (1995) (reviewing THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 27). 
33. See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 18, at 244 n.2 (criticizing, inter alia, Gordon, Inquiry into 
the Merits of Copyright, supra note 3). 
34. For an illustration of the continuing value of the economics of information, see MICHAEL 
J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 106-18 (1993). 
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instabilities. Second, he shows us how a myth of authorship-that is, 
granting private property to whomever can best be styled an "author" 
and denying private property to those who cannot claim the authorial 
mantle-works to provide answers that the unstable law cannot 
otherwise provide. Third, he argues that the results generated by the 
"authorship myth" are often counterproductive, giving prior 
generations of authors-and corporations-power that inhibits the 
free speech of new authors.35 
Oddly, it is not Boyle's culminating argument that possesses the 
most value. We already know that present authors are indebted to 
prior authors, and (at least since Landes and Posner36 made it 
explicit) we all know that increasing the rewards to one generation of 
authors can increase the costs of creation for the next generation. No 
one would deny the need to use one's predecessors. One need not cite 
Harold Bloom for the proposition that poets create by building on, 
and repudiating, works of prior poets.37 So Boyle is joining a chorus 
when he tells us that each generation builds on the accomplishments 
of the prior generation, and that broad intellectual property rights can 
stifle new growth. Yet there is importance in Boyle's treatment of 
how the authorial image may have obscured this well-known set of 
truths.38 
35. Boyle also works through a set of puzzles to show us both the law's inability to deal 
consistently with information and that the myth of authorship plays a strong but inappropriate 
role in each. The puzzles are from copyright law, blackmail law, the law of body parts (the 
famous "spleen case" from California), and insider trading. Given the nature of this Review, it 
seemed best to omit discussion of these so-called puzzles, except for one-the spleen case that 
Radin helps to illuminate. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
36. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATIJRE: A 
MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 338-52 (1988) (discussing copyright law). Of course, the point has 
been made, albeit more impressionistically, many times before. One of the most effective 
presentations of the debt each generation of authors owes its predecessor appears throughout 
Benjamin Kaplan's An Unhurried View of Copyright. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED 
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT (1967). 
37. For Bloom's elaboration of this proposition, see HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF 
INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY (1973). The phrase "a dwarf standing on the shoulders of 
a giant may see farther than a giant himself' is such a truism that one sociologist wrote a book 
exploring the ironic difficulties one has in trying to trace authorship of the phrase itself. See 
ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPf 4 (1965). 
38. Among other things, the romantic vision of authorship sees creators as not needing to 
borrow from predecessors, an illusion that conceals a central reason for limiting the scope of 
intellectual property rights. 
In commenting on the historical shift whereby inspiration ceases to come from muses 
"outside" the poet but rather finds its originating locus "inside" the poet, Fran~oise Meltzer 
writes: 
(T]he terms "inside" and "outside" have a complex history with respect to inspiration. In 
the West, inspiration comes mainly from the "outside" (visits from gods, demons, prophetic 
dreams, and of course, genies) until the organicist myths that spawned early romanticism. 
The organicists ... argue that genius is like a seed, impounding its own substance; all the 
material is already there, inside, and needs only the proper watering to unfold. This move 
from the outside to the inside is mirrored at the linguistic level: in the latter part of the 
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Boyle argues that the seductive force of the authorship myth lies in 
its apparent power to resolve the "public"/"private" opposition that, 
he argues, usually governs the law of information. Thus, Boyle claims 
that when information is seen as "public," our legal system values 
equality in access, and lawmakers envision efficiency as flowing from 
free use unencumbered by the restraints of private property. 
Symmetrically, Boyle claims that when information is seen as 
"private," our legal system values protecting an author's or subject's 
boundaries, and lawmakers envision economic gains as flowing 
primarily from the incentives to create that property rights generate. 
In Boyle's view, the law at present contains no principled way to 
choose between the "public" and "private" paradigms, and the 
authorial image purportedly provides a mode of bringing resolution 
to difficult cases.39 
Even a copyright scholar convinced that U.S. courts put social 
welfare concerns before authorial personality interests40 can be 
gradually persuaded by Boyle that some courts really do attempt to 
identify and reward "authors." Admittedly, there are other 
explanations, if Boyle's examples are taken individually.41 But, 
cumulatively, he persuades. 
A pivotal moment comes in his discussion of Feist Publications v. 
Rural Telephone. 42 When the Supreme Court in Feist denied 
copyright to a white-pages telephone directory, much of the copyright 
bar agreed with the result-copyright should not be used to 
monopolize bare facts, but should be restricted to protecting the 
original and creative arrangement of facts. But many were deeply 
puzzled by the primary rationale the Court used to justify that result: 
the claim that facts are found rather than authored.43 Few of us are 
naive enough to imagine that "facts" are unfiltered by the observer's 
eighteenth century, in German, French, and English, for example, one begins to be a genius 
rather than to have genius. . . . [T]he romantic legacy . . . modifies the topography of 
originality .... 
FRANCOISE MELlZER, HOT PROPERTY: THE STAKES AND CLAIMS OF LITERARY ORIGINALITY 
12 (1994). 
39. The power to resolve dilemmas does not make a good decisionmaker. Consider the 
common penny: flipping it can answer any "yes" or "no" question, but is hardly a reliable guide. 
40. On the primacy of economic and related social welfare concerns, see Gordon, Fair Use 
as Market Failure, supra note 26, at 1602-27; Gordon, Property Right in Self-Expression, supra 
note 29, at 1607-09 (proposing a connection between natural rights theory and the economic 
approach to copyright law). 
41. For example, Radin implicitly gives an alternative explanation of the spleen case. See 
infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. 
42. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
43. See id. at 347 (citing, inter alia, MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT§ 2.03[E] (1990)); see also id. at 361 ("[T]he raw data does not satisfy the originality 
requirement. ... [T]hey existed before Rural reported them and would have continued to exist 
if Rural had never published a telephone directory."). 
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judgment, purposes, and presuppositions.44 Further, most of the facts 
in a phone book-names, addresses, and phone numbers-are created 
rather than found. Our names are chosen by our parents, our street 
addresses are manufactured by housing developers or city bureaucrats, 
and our phone numbers are generated by the phone company. 
Probably most of the fans of the Feist opinion simply liked the way 
its result furthered First Amendment goals. As for the opinion's logic, 
we simply shrugged and attributed the Court's naivete to its having 
thoughtlessly relied on the inadequate treatment given the subject by 
the Nimmer copyright treatise.45 However, when Boyle goes through 
his discussion limning the authorial features discovered by courts, the 
reader is finally convinced: The Court in Feist did not simply rely 
lazily on Nimmer. It went looking for a personalized author, and 
denied copyright when it could not find one. Perhaps the authorial 
conceit does matter, and perhaps it is indeed the force of the 
authorial conceit that often. blocks consideration of alternative 
policies.46 
Ill. RADIN 
Radin concentrates on a different force that blocks consideration of 
alternative policies, namely the law-and-economics paradigm. She 
fears that when policymakers face a social problem, they will ask 
"why not the market?" This may distract them from asking the 
important and open question, "what should we do?" 
Defenders of the economic perspective typically argue that 
beginning an inquiry inside the market paradigm at least provides a 
structured set of questions to ask, thereby guiding our further 
questioning.47 Potential forms of market failure are many but not 
infinite. Forms of market failure include, for example, externalities, 
information imperfections, wealth or income effects, strategic 
behavior, and (perhaps) nonmonetizability. One can use each form of 
market failure to structure the inquiry "why not honor the 
market?"48 instead of being forced to roam at large. In fact, one of 
44. For a more detailed discussion, see Gordon, Reality as Artifact, supra note 29, at 93. 
45. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 43. For an alternative rationale and extension of the 
Feist holding, see Gordon, Reality as Artifact, supra note 29. 
46. For example, without the authorial conceit, perhaps the Court would have addressed the 
free speech issues more comprehensively. 
47. For an excellent discussion comparing Radin's views with the market failure approach, 
see 'TREBILCOCK, supra note 34, at 23-57. 
48. See, e.g., Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 26, at 1605-15, 1627-35 (using 
market failure to structure a fair use analysis); Gordon, On the Economics of Copyright, supra 
note 28 (using the market failure characteristic of endowment effect to justify judicial refusal to 
enforce private censorship); Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 28, at 1041-
49 (discussing private censorship as market failure). 
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the most common criticisms of Radin is the imprecision of the 
answers she gives to specific questions49 and the free-flowing nature 
of her inquiry. 
Radin willingly concedes that most practitioners of law and 
economics understand that there are limits to the market's usefulness. 
She also recognizes that sophisticated practitioners like Michael 
Trebilcock can and do use economic tools to explore the same kinds 
of problems with which she is concerned. Radin, however, wishes to 
suggest inadequacies in the economists' touchstone for analyzing those 
limits, namely, the market failure paradigm. It can be argued that 
using this paradigm is not as good as starting from a premise that is 
more agnostic: in part because the market-failure paradigm prejudges 
where the burden of proof should be located, in part because it 
pushes the analysis toward a mimic-the-market kind of result, but 
primarily because it constrains the likely answers. 
Even for one who prefers the discipline imposed by the challenge 
of the market-failure model, Radin's objections are powerful. Her 
book reminds us that the price for that model's apparent neatness 
might be to miss those wholes that are greater than the sum of their 
parts. For example, if a person needs a kidney, the question "why 
can't I buy it?" might distract us from asking, "how should the legal 
system restructure health care so that preventive medicine makes 
kidney transplants less necessary?"50 An economist is better 
equipped than a moralist to address the latter, more open-ended 
question, but Radin argues that the market failure paradigm may 
make it difficult for the economist properly to formulate the question 
in the first instance. Similarly, Radin argues that "why not the 
market?" is a question that implicitly favors the status quo, locking us 
into the "double bind" that so much commodification presents.51 
However horrible the sale might be in the eye of the observer,52 
49. See Gillian Hadfield, Book Review, 48 U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming Winter 1998) 
(reviewing RADIN, supra note 19). 
50. Thanks to Ann Seidman for helping Wendy Gordon see why these questions may indeed 
lead to different results. This is something Sam Postbrief knew already. For example, consider 
this remark from his notes on Boyle: "[E]fficiency and perfect information are the holy relics 
of economic theorists, which fix and inflame the devotion to the creed." 
51. For Radin's discussion of "double bind," see RADIN, supra note 19, at 123-30. See also 
infra note 73. 
52. Economists sometimes try to capture observers' reactions through "moralism"-that is, 
the cost to observers ( disutility) of seeing something horrible. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas 
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-15 (1972). However, though it may be important to measure the 
discomfort that horrible choices cause to observers, that is hardly the most important issue. Such 
horrors do not become less important to a deontological or fairness analysis when hidden. This 
is well illustrated in Calabresi and Melamed's separate discussion of "other justice reasons," see 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra, at 1102-05, and in Frank Michelman's discussion of how the 
cognate concept, "demoralization cost," would be treated differently under an economic or a 
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prohibiting the sale (and losing the money it could generate) may 
leave the subordinated or poverty-stricken seller feeling further 
exploited. 
In addition to criticizing the market failure approach, Radin also 
finds inadequacies in liberal efforts to take account of nonmarket 
values. The liberal approach she criticizes most vigorously is com-
partmentalization: that is, the division of social life into separate 
spheres-some governed by money, some by beauty, some by talent, 
and some by political strength. Her main target in this regard is 
Michael Walzer. Walzer insists that justice requires not permitting the 
criteria that rule in one sphere (such as the market) to rule in other 
spheres (such as politics).53 Radin makes a strong case that a model 
of "separate spheres" is inadequate, as most occasions involve 
mixtures of commodified and noncommodified values. 
While this is an apt point, it does not impair the key value of 
Walzer's work. Walzer's central point is the same as Radin's own: "to 
show that many of us do have implicit unrecognized commitments to 
incommensurability," and to assert that these commitments deserve 
respect.54 
As mentioned, Radin is sometimes criticized for failing to make 
definite pronouncements.55 It is true that at the close of her book, 
the reader still does not know whether babies and kidneys should or 
should not be commodified.56 But this is not necessarily a problem. 
Radin accomplishes her purpose, which is to open up inquiry and to 
add the issue of commodification discourse to the reader's personal 
agenda. As for the lack of definite recommendations, are specific 
proposals really necessary? Only hubris would lead law professors to 
imagine that judges or legislatures would adopt their academic 
prescriptions in toto.57 
Radin's concerns extend beyond the blinders that economics can 
put around the eyes of policymakers. She fears that the spread of the 
market into new domains-through the sale of blood, organs for 
fairness-based normative system, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: 
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 
1214-15 (1967). 
53. See WALZER, supra note 16. 
54. RADIN, supra note 19, at 9. 
55. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 34, at 26-29; Hadfield, supra note 49. 
56. Regarding body parts, Radin is not certain whether or not "people should be able to sell 
their kidneys or corneas." See RADIN, supra note 19, at 161. As for baby-selling, her objections 
to allowing markets in babies are qualified and contingent. See id. at 137-40. 
57. In addition, Radin may have some sympathy for the deconstructionist enterprise and its 
focus (at least in the hands of some practitioners) on resisting certainties and keeping discourse 
open. For an accessible popular account of this aspect of deconstruction, see Nick Smith, 
Comment, Jncommensurability and Alterity in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 
503 (1997). 
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transfer, babies, and surrogacy-will lead to a degraded self-concep-
tion for the populace in general, as persons might come to view 
themselves as little more than "bundles of commodities. "58 Radin 
reiterates throughout her book that lawmakers tempted to extend the 
market into these new domains need to take into account how such 
market extensions might degrade people's self-perceptions. In 
particular, she wants policymakers to ask whether extending com-
modification into a particular sphere might lead to "universal com-
modification, "59 as a result of which Americans might come to view 
themselves and all of their capacities as fungible packages of goods 
for sale. She urges that lawmakers avoid laws that might encourage 
such a shift in human values. 
Hence, Radin suggests deliberately using law to affect nonlegal 
norms. This is a popular topic6() and hardly an uncontroversial one. 
For example, Richard Posner was recently quoted as saying that the 
effort to use law to affect values is both "paternalistic" and "potential-
ly totalitarian."61 How would Radin reply to charges such as these? 
First, of course, Radin would reply that her work is meant to be 
antiauthoritarian and empowering. But an observer would have to 
concede that Radin is hardly clear in explaining precisely how a 
society would choose the appropriate values to pursue.62 
A second argument is explicit in Radin's book. She contends that 
the impact of law on norms is inevitable and already occurring.63 She 
might even add, "so far it's your normative paradigm that's winning, 
58. She refers to this danger as a potential "domino effect." RADIN, supra note 19, at 95. 
59. Radin has been variously interpreted in regard to whether a domino effect will occur, 
resulting in "universal commodification." She sees universal commodification as far from 
inevitable. Instead, Radin asks that each time policymakers consider extending the market to 
a new domain, they make an empirical decision as to whether the proposed extension is likely 
to further the reach of commodification rhetoric. 
60. The feedback loop between law and norms has become popular enough to make it into 
the New Yorker. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Social Police: Following the Law Because You'd 
Be Too Embarrassed Not To, NEW YORKER, Oct. 20 & 27, 1997, at 170; see also Symposium, 
Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996). 
61. As quoted in the New Yorker, Judge Posner said: 
Government has a role in encouraging people to be law-abiding, but when it gets down to 
trying to get people to like each other, to change people's values and make them more 
tolerant-this whole notion of shaping people's preferences through government-I don't 
like it particularly. I think it's both paternalistic and likely to be ineffective, but to the 
extent that it is effective, it's likely to be totalitarian. 
Rosen, supra note 60, at 176. 
62. Theorists of incommensurability such as Radin are usually linked to "abhorrence for 
authoritarianism." Smith, supra note 57, at 509. The notion is that by insisting on particularity 
and context, and by resisting utilitarianism and other monistic value systems, the incommen-
surability theorist works to make room for diversity. See id. at 510. Yet despite her caveats, 
Radin often seems to assume that there can be one unified view of "human flourishing"-that 
is, her prose contains hints of a quasi-essentialist perspective. 
63. Radin argues that law cannot avoid having an impact on discourse. She argues that either 
alternative-that is, regulation with an eye to discouraging the discourse of commodification, or 
nonregulation-"underwrites a conceptual structure." RADIN, supra note 19, at 176. 
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Judge Posner." It is hard to argue with Radin on that point. Law and 
economics is being taught every day to law students, who presumably 
go out into the world to convey its perspective to their clients. More 
significantly, the dominant cry all over the world is for privatization 
and markets. So what Radin urges might prove little more than a 
corrective to an already over-dominant ideology.64 
The book also contains a third possible response to Posner. Radin 
would likely argue that the totalitarian impulse can be constrained by 
the usual boundaries of free speech doctrine, namely, the distinction 
between speech and behavior.65 Here, however, Radin needs more 
detail and more exploration of the very contexts the importance of 
which she so often emphasizes elsewhere in the book. 
Nevertheless, there is great appeal in Radin's idealistic call to focus 
on the human being as something more than a buying and selling 
organism. Radin's failure to provide a full account of "human 
fiourishing,"66 or to account for the epistemological and political 
problems inherent in governmental pursuit of such a goal, is hardly 
fatal. Any scholar can do little more than place individual paving 
stones on the mud, hoping that others will explore and extend the 
path she has identified. Radin makes a persuasive case that the 
markets that provided us a way out of feudalism had their dangers as 
well as their advantages. Those whom she persuades can take up the 
task of analyzing the comparative merits of different methods of 
discouraging commodification rhetoric. 
Radin's work is not only prescriptive. Her descriptive efforts, 
analyzing how people come to view themselves and their possessions, 
are also valuable. Here she functions as part of a community of 
scholars seeking to identify a conception of humanity "thicker" than 
the economists' traditional conception,67 and from which today's 
economists are learning. Consider the economic assumption that 
individuals' preferences are capable of ranking all resources and 
behaviors on a commensurable and transitive scale.68 Preferences are 
64. For the most part, however, the judges and legislatures that effectuate the dominant 
market ideology do so unconsciously. It is important not to understate how different are the 
dangers that arise when lawmakers explicitly and deliberately attempt to shape values through 
law. 
65. Radin tries to meet the First Amendment issue head-on by, for example, distinguishing 
between laws that would prohibit reading books that advocate baby-selling, and laws that would 
prohibit baby-selling itself. See RADIN, supra note 19, at 176-83. 
66. The account she does present is borrowed in part from Martha Nussbaum. See RADIN, 
supra note 19, at 66-68. One of its key aspects seems to be the interplay between change and 
stability. The market, historically, opened up the option of change for individuals. Radin 
recognizes the value of being free from feudal status categories, but is concerned that the 
importance of stable context be preserved. 
67. See, e.g., ELIZABETII ANDERSON, v ALUE IN Ennes AND ECONOMICS (1993) (exploring 
incommensurability and related topics). 
68. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A 
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"transitive" if, for example, someone who prefers A to B and B to C 
will also prefer A to C. 
Radin adds to our understanding of how context matters to people's 
preference structures. Given the importance of context, resource A, 
B, or C will not necessarily have a stable meaning or value, even for 
one person. The value of a resource may vary with factors such as 
whether the person owns the resource or needs to purchase it, or even 
how the question about valuation is posed. Economists often brag that 
their assumptions need not be accurate so long as the predictions that 
economics yields are accurate. Yet some investigators of human-
choice behavior have produced results for which a contextual 
approach like Radin's is more predictive than standard economic 
assumptions about preferences.69 
Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1667, 1679-81 
(1974) (describing assumptions underlying the economic paradigm). For criticism of this notion, 
and its implications for commensurability, see Gillian Hadfield, Reconceptualizing Rational 
·Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming May 1998). 
69. Consider, for example, the importance of whether the price a person is willing to accept 
to give up a resource is the same as the amount he would have been willing to pay to purchase 
the same resource. Even in a world without transaction costs, a unique efficient outcome 
(sometimes called the strong version of the Coase Theorem, see Herbert Hovencamp, Marginal 
Utility and the Coase Theorem, 15 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 786 (1990)) is achievable only if there 
is no significant difference between these two measures. Coase's own analysis in the original The 
Problem of Social Cost, R.H. COASE, The Problem of Social Cost, in nm FIRM, THE MARKET, 
AND THE LA w 95 (1988) [hereinafter CO ASE, Problem of Social Cost], assumes that the price 
a person would demand in exchange for selling a resource she owns is the same as the price that 
same person would pay to buy the resource if the law did not give her an entitlement to it. 
Of course, in real life these two prices often differ. The issue is how often such variance 
appears, and how significant it is. For example, Coase's later position no longer depends on an 
exact identity between buy and sell prices, but still relies on there being little variance between 
them. See R.H. COASE, Notes on the Problem of Social Cost, in nm FIRM, THE MARKET, AND 
THE LAW, supra, at 157, 170-74. A valuable review of the experimental evidence, and some 
related normative discussion, can be found in Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, 
Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 59 (1993). 
One can view Radin as arguing simply that people become attached to their possessions, and 
that is Hoffman and Spitzer's narrow characterization of her view. See id. at 90. But one could 
read Radin's lesson more broadly, as indicating that possessions vary in value with the context 
in which their value is assessed. If so, then in every experiment Hoffman and Spitzer cite, the 
approach of Radin and her compatriots supports the experimental evidence. 
To show this, focus on one aspect of "context": People usually do not like to sell personal 
possessions. Among other things, such sale often connotes a "pawn shop" level of need that 
most of us are uncomfortable demonstrating. Cf. Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Ethics of Organ 
Sales, 4 ANN. REV. L. & Enncs/JAHRBUOi FOR REOIT UNO ETIIlK 115, 134 (1996) ("(F]ew 
of the rich would sell their blood for fear of the reputational damage that might result if it were 
known that they were selling blood, a sure sign of financial distress."). If so, we should not be 
surprised that experimental subjects demanded more money to sell coffee mugs they were given 
than the subjects were willing to pay in order to purchase such mugs. See Hoffman & Spitzer, 
supra, at 76-78 (discussing mug experiments). Conversely, the willingness-to-accept and 
willingness-to-pay prices tend to converge precisely where such contextual "pawn shop" 
connotations do not arise-as in the experiments involving the purchase and sale of securities, 
see id. at 78-84 (since unlike one's mugs and other dishes, securities are meant for sale), or, in 
a clearly artificial setting such as the one in which subjects are given the choice of spitting out 
or holding in their mouths a bitter-tasting solution. See id. at 69-76. 
150 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 10: 135 
IV. BOYLE MEETS RADIN: ON How TO TREAT OUR SOURCES 
Boyle stresses that authorship is overvalued by our intellectual 
property system. He emphasizes that our law undervalues sources, 
such as the rain forest, shamanist knowledge of medicine, or com-
munity cultural images. In his view, these are undervalued because 
they are treated as a "commons" that anyone may use and are 
deprived of property status. For Boyle, this is a great evil. Radin, 
however, provides a hint as to why, perhaps, we might not want to 
deem all sources objects of private property. 
To clarify this subtle potential conflict between Radin's view and 
Boyle's, it will be useful to examine Boyle's analysis of Moore v. 
Regents of the University of California,70 the famous "spleen case." 
In Moore, a panel of California judges held that a patient was not 
entitled to own the commercially valuable cell line that doctors had 
grown, without his consent, from his excised spleen.71 In his analysis 
of the case, Boyle argues that the judges employed a language of 
authorship out of all proportion to the facts. In the judges' view, he 
suggests, the scientists added all of the value, and the spleen 
contributed nothing different from what any random spleen could 
have provided. But, Boyle argues, had the patient's spleen not 
possessed unusual properties, its cells would have hardly been as 
valuable for research as their unique properties made them. Boyle 
contends that the authorship model led the judges simultaneously to 
overvalue the doctors' contribution and to undervalue the contribu-
tion of the spleen source itself. It also may have led the court to 
ignore or underplay alternative policies. 
One may question Boyle's interpretation of the opinion. But if one 
looked at the fact pattern of Moore de novo, the most likely inquiry 
for use in the Moore case would have been to ask what bad or good 
effects flow from giving humans alienable property in their organs or 
cells.72 The most obvious good effect would be a potential increase 
in the supply of body parts and resultant advances in medical care. 
Radin provides some assistance in determining the bad effects. For 
Radin, the most obvious dangers of giving alienable property rights 
in spleens and other body parts would be twofold: first, damage to 
personhood, as people began to think of their bodies as separable 
70. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
71. Ultimately, the patient was held to have stated a good cause of action arising out of a 
lack of informed consent, but he was not entitled to a property interest in the cell line. See id. 
at 497. 
72. The court did not completely ignore this inquiry. See id. at 493-97. 
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from themselves;73 and second, increased oppression and subor-
dination for those persons led to sell body parts.74 
Radin might well conclude that the good effects of granting 
property rights in spleens (increased incentives to provide cultivated 
cell lines for research) could be achieved in part by giving alienable 
property rights to researchers who do the cell cultivation. She might 
likewise conclude that the bad effects (injuries to personhood and 
subordination) could be largely avoided by denying patients legal 
power to sell their spleens. Patients would then not be tempted to sell 
parts of themselves, or to think of themselves in monetary terms. 
This bifurcated answer-property for the doctors, not for the 
patient-is essentially the result the court reached in Moore.75 Thus, 
even if we grant to Boyle that the judges' decision was influenced by 
a sentimental adherence to authorship imagery, Radin's analysis may 
provide an alternative explanation for the result the court reached. 
The convergence between the Moore holding and a potential Radin 
analysis suggests, in turn, that Radin may offer some clues about why 
our law is reluctant to permit property rights in the cultural commons 
from which intellectual properties are built. Her dominant inquiry is 
how legal characterizations can affect self-conception. Bringing her 
question to bear on the ownership of cultural commons does yield 
fruit. For if our common culture-our "sources"-were fully owned, 
our conceptions of ourselves might change in deleterious ways. We 
might even begin to cooperate less with social norms. 
Why do people show consideration for others? The answer is not 
only the Pavlovian conditioning of childhood. Why do people obey 
the law? The answer is not only the power of legal penalty. An 
important alternative source of each (presumptively desirable) 
behavior is our feeling of debt. At least for the middle class, we feel 
73. See RADIN, supra note 19, at 125. Radin notes that "[t]he debate over whether people 
should be able to sell their kidneys or corneas raises the issue whether organs are or are not an 
aspect or attribute of personhood." Id. at 161. Radin, however, does not know how to resolve 
this question, in part because organ-commodifiers might be exercising autonomy in choosing to 
sell. See id. This is related to what Radin calls the double bind: that both permitting and 
forbidding sales have cruel effects. Until income redistribution or other policies make it possible 
to survive without selling things so tied to personhood, there may be an argument in favor of 
permitting such sales. See id. at 123-30. 
74. See id. at 159. It might be argued that even if the plaintiff Mr. Moore had prevailed in 
his ownership claim, the case would have provided precedent only for people to own parts of 
their bodies that are both inessential to continued life and that had to be removed for reasons 
unrelated to the possibility of commercial sale. But one does not have to accept the "domino 
theory," see id. at 95-103, 145, to doubt that the effect of a pro-property decision could have 
been so narrowly cabined. 
75. The doctors were granted property rights in the spleen cells, and the patient was denied 
them. The patient retained a right to exclude, but it was a personal right that did not translate 
into a right to share in the commercial proceeds. It was a personal right against breach of 
fiduciary duty and lack of informed consent, rather than a right measurable by the profit the 
invader might reap. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 483-86. 
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that we are part of a common society that has given us much, and 
that we owe something in exchange.76 Fellow-feeling might not long 
survive conversion of our culture into a cash-and-carry commodity. 
Some feminist theorists might scoff at this kind of analysis. It is the 
kind of idealization that leads society to say "work in the home is so 
precious that we don't want to put a price on it"-so that no mother 
gets paid in dollars, and too many mothers fail to be paid at all.77 
But preciousness and pricelessness possess a double edge. 
If we refuse to grant property rights, we may preserve valuable 
aspects of "personhood," but people who value things in commercial 
terms may come to undervalue the things to which the law denies full 
alienable property status. Since so much of societal valuation is 
commercially based, refusing to allow something to be bought and 
sold may lead to its being undervalued,78 just as much as its being 
bought and sold may lead to its being wrongly valued. As with the 
other double binds, the best solution may not be to grant property 
rights, despite the short-run attractions of doing so. (Boyle's sugges-
tion is that the sources be propertized.) The best recourse yet may be 
to restructure our notions of value, to reexamine our notion of the 
commons, and to refresh our societal sense of reciprocity and mutual 
debt. 
V. BOYLE MEETS RADIN AGAIN: WHEN PARTS OF ONE'S SELF 
ARRIVE PRE-ALIENATED 
Let us return to the issue broached in this Book Review's Introduc-
tion: namely, the proper scope of intellectual property law. Property 
law typically has two main normative concerns: "what things should 
be ownable?" and "what rights should constitute ownership?" The 
two questions are overlapping subsets of the same issue-"how should 
76. See generally LAWRENCE BECKER, RECIPROCITY (1986) (presenting a philosophical 
exploration of the importance of reciprocity in human relations). 
77. See Katherine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women's Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 81 (1997). Many of us recall a situation comedy from the 1950s in which the female 
character, a wife and mother, is forced to cancel a doctor's appointment (perhaps because of an 
emergency at home) but is nevertheless billed for the time. "The doctor's time is valuable," she 
is told. Later, the doctor has a medical emergency and keeps the mother in his waiting room for 
hours, and finally cannot meet with her. The mother sends the doctor (male) a bill for her lost 
time. The doctor does not pay, and the mother sues. The final scene is in the courtroom. What 
does the judge say? "The time spent in motherhood is indeed valuable, even more valuable 
perhaps than the doctor's time. But precisely because it is so valuable, no price can be put on 
it. Case dismissed." The mother has to pay the doctor, and he does not have to pay her. 
78. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 34, at 50-51 (exploring the debate over payment for 
surrogacy, and raising the possibility that denial of monetary compensation reinforces society's 
undervaluation of such contributions); see also Silbaugh, supra note 77, at 84-109 (defending the 
use of economic discourse in the context of Jaw and household labor). 
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the law of property affect the relations among persons?"-and 
provide a useful entree into the larger issue. 
What things are ownable in our system? fypically we own cars, 
clothes, jewelry, money, books, stock in trade, tools of one's trade, 
securities, and real estate.79 In Contested Commodities, Radin is 
interested in the things not usually ownable, but that may be on the 
verge of becoming either ownable or exploitable commercially: human 
organs, babies, fetal tissue, the use of women as surrogate mothers or 
sexual partners. She is concerned with things unusual for property 
law. Boyle, too, is interested in atypical subject matters. For him, 
however, the atypical subject matter of interest is information.80 
Oddly, Boyle largely ignores Radin's point and Radin largely ignores 
Boyle's subject matter. So let us make the intersection for them. 
When does information (Boyle's topic) become personal (Radin's 
topic)? 
Information becomes personal to its recipient as soon as its 
substance matters to the receiving mind-which happens as soon as 
information is something more than stock in trade.81 Yet to its 
creator, information might continue to be personal even after it is 
sold. So information can be personal not only for the person who 
sends it out, but also for the recipient who integrates it; for the 
audience as well as for the author. It can be simultaneously personal 
for all of us.82 
What about the nature of the rights that should attach to infor-
mation when it is a personal resource? What most concerns Radin is 
the power to alienate-separating the thing from the self, and doing 
so for a purely instrumental reason: for example, receiving money, so 
that the person loses something human and gets something cold in 
exchange.83 Boyle does not say so, but this is one way of charac-
terizing his concerns as well: He worries that intellectual property 
rules have the potential to separate audience members from segments 
79. Radin is famous for making distinctions among these: Some things have "personal" 
meanings, such as the meaning wedding rings have for a bride and groom versus the meaning 
they have for a jeweler. She suggests that perhaps the law should make room for these other 
meanings. Radin thus has had a crucial role in opening up formal categories. 
80. This Book Review follows Boyle in using the term "information" broadly, to embrace 
any intangible product of intellectual or artistic labor. In such a lexicon, both data and digitized 
visual images are "information." 
81. The recipient for whom information is merely stock in trade might be called a "pure free 
rider" or "stowaway." Such a person largely Jacks ethical claim to free use. See Gordon, Property 
Right in Self-Expression, supra note 29, at 1576-78. 
82. An economist might refer to the "inexhaustible" or "public goods" nature of information 
since it can be so widely shared. 
83. Of course, the defender of alienation might reply that the seller can use the cold cash 
to buy something warm, such as food for a child. This dilemma is part of Radin's concern with 
double binds. 
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of themselves,84 and artists from the material they encounter in their 
lives and culture. 
At first, Radin does not seem to have much to say about inherently 
nonexclusive intangibles like ideas, images, and other intellectual 
products. That is because she is concerned with alienation, and one 
can never divest one's mind of something that is learned, short of 
submitting to a brainwash. Yet, one can alienate the power to express 
in the world what is in the mind. And expressing the mind in the 
world is part of what it means to be human. 
So, taking Boyle and Radin together, we emerge with this concern: 
Copyright law pre-alienates. It lets things come into the mind that are 
already owned by someone else. 
In a culture where works are ubiquitous, we may not have a 
meaningful opportunity to refuse entrance to others' images, music, 
and ideas.85 It may not even be normatively appropriate to insist that 
one refuse when one can; basic access to culture may be a good to 
which everyone should be entitled. Once the information (the image, 
the poem, the music) is in the mind, the person will start to use it, 
relate to it, embroider it, and weave it into her life experience. 
Copyright might prohibit the person from expressing those 
elaborations. Such enforced passivity in regard to one's own concep-
tions could amount to a kind of separation from one's own mind.86 
It is precisely those things that we are likely to integrate into our 
minds-to embroider and weave into our plans-that are most likely 
to be called "ideas." The importance of keeping us free to use these 
is one reason why "ideas" are not ownable under copyright. They are 
commonly (rather than privately) owned. 
Is this common ownership inalienable? Classically, when a right or 
resource was designated as "inalienable," the designation usually 
denoted that one could not permanently divest one's self of that right 
84. Boyle is also concerned with increasing ownership rights of sources, which (like any 
increase in ownership rights) has potential for restraining audience spontaneity and self-develop-
ment. This pro-property part of Boyle's book is well-intentioned but not well-thought-through. 
Giving enforceable property rights to indigenous communities for their "common knowledge" 
may well be defensible in distributive justice terms, as against certain strangers, but the issue is 
complex. 
85. Compare the importance of "opportunity to decline" in restitution law. See PETER 
BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 1HE LAW OF RESTITUTION265-93 (1985) (discussing a principle 
of free acceptance). But see A.S. Burrows, Free Acceptance and the Law of Restitution, 104 LA w 
Q. REV. 576 (1988) (arguing against the use of a free acceptance principle). For an exploration 
of free acceptance and opportunity to reject in the context of fair use and other intellectual 
property doctrines, see Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 8, at 211-29; and Gordon, 
Property Right in Self-Expression, supra note 29, at 1578-81. 
86. Cf. J.S.G. Boggs, Who Owns This?, 68 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 889, 890 (1993) ("When I 
hear the words intellectual property, they make me think of the things inside me .... "); Litman, 
supra note 29, at 1016 ("Some aspects of works of authorship are easily absorbed, and once we 
have absorbed them, we are likely to make them our own and lose sight of their origins."). 
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or resource and transfer it to another.87 Thus, the right to free 
speech is said to be "inalienable" in that one might temporarily 
decline to employ one's right of free speech, but one cannot per-
manently give it away.ss The legal prohibition on all slavery, even 
that which is voluntarily entered, is another example of inalienability. 
Radin's analytic entry was to exploit an ambiguity in this traditional 
broad meaning of "inalienable."s9 In Contested Commodities, she 
continues to explore the distinction between those rights and 
resources of which one cannot divest one's self at all, and those rights 
and resources that can be given away, or even traded for other goods 
in kind, but the sale of which the law prohibits. She coined the term 
"market-inalienability" to identify the latter type of limited 
prohibition. 
Yet there is a functional link between the traditional kind of 
"inalienable right" found in the Declaration of Independence, and 
Radin's market-inalienability. This linkage occurs with regard to 
inexhaustible resources. 
Clifford Holderness has distinguished between two ways a resource 
can be owned.90 The resource can be owned by a "closed class" 
(such as an individual or a defined small group) or an "open class" 
(such as the public). He points out that resources can be exchanged 
most easily when they are owned by a closed class. He urges this as 
a virtue for private, closed-class ownership.91 
When an inexhaustible resource is owned by an "open class," there 
may be no way for it to be transferred effectively and permanently. 
For example, if we all own a piece of information, buying silence from 
one person only opens us to the threat of disclosure from another.92 
So, if we all have a right of free speech, no one party could ever 
afford to shut us up. For even if one bribed us all to silence, the next 
newly born child could-upon learning to speak-extract from the 
buyer all his remaining surplus, leaving the buyer penniless when the 
next-after-next child comes on the scene. Thus, entitlements owned by 
an open class like the public may be inalienable in a practical 
sense.93 
87. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 52, at 1113. 
88. And, by implication, the government cannot argue that the populace agreed to give up 
the right as a "price" for order. See JOHN LOCICE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. 
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690). 
89. See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
90. See Clifford Holderness, A Legal Foundation for Exchange, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 
(1985). 
91. See id. at 322-23, 328-29. 
92. This is one of the grounds advanced to justify the criminalization of blackmail. 
93. The Coase theorem posits that in a world without transaction costs, resources will always 
be transferred to their highest-valued use. But if the class of owners is continually opening to 
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How, then, would law treat intellectual property if it strives to meet 
Radin's goals of honoring the personal? Since certain information is 
potentially personal to both creator and audience, and "ideas" seem 
to be this kind of information, the law might refuse to give either the 
author or the audience a right to exclude. That is, the law might 
advocate sharing between them,94 and that is at least in part what 
our law of copyright does.95 And once the ownership of ideas was 
shared by the public, it would be inalienable in the broad sense of the 
word. Ultimately, the ideas could not be effectually controlled by pur-
chase.96 Not even the government would have enough money to buy 
the ideas from us. Nor could anyone-not even an affecting ideologue 
or a sweet-talking Department of Mind Control-effectively obtain 
the ideas from us by gift, so long as the ideas remained part of the 
commonly owned public domain. 
What of "fair use," the copyright doctrine that allows copying, 
parodying, and altering copyrighted works without their authors' 
permissions? The doctrine historically has sheltered free speech, as 
well as making possible transactions that could not be effectuated 
through the market. 97 At least one court has responded to a decrease 
new members, and if those members cannot be bound by the sales decisions of the preexisting 
class, then transfers can never be complete. A publicly owned right to information would thus 
be immune from the Coase theorem: No final transfer to a highest-valued use would be possible. 
It therefore is to be hoped that the law in assigning the entitlement to the public has correctly 
given the right ab initio to the highest-valued use. 
94. There could, coexistent with a duty to share, be a duty to pay. In fact, such "liability 
rule" solutions are often recommended as compromises to dilemmas in property law. Copyright 
law has long embraced explicit "compulsory licenses," and the role of such liability rule solutions 
will likely increase in the future. Thus, the Supreme Court, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 
569, 578 n.10 (1995), hinted that a member of the public who wished to do a parody might be 
permitted to do so, subject to a duty to pay for the "stock in trade" aspect of the copying. 
95. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). It should be noted, however, that some states have 
indicated a willingness to give property-like rights to ideas on the purported rationale that 
federal copyrights only reach subject matter affirmatively protected by the federal statute. See 
Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1532 n.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (dictum). 
96. This is also a practical implementation of Walzer's goal: Granting a resource to an open 
class may effectively eliminate the power of money to centralize ownership of that resource. If 
the resource is one that should be governed by nonmonetary standards, one way of ensuring that 
result is to grant the resource to an open class. 
97. Today it is virtually impossible for a copyright owner to extract fees from everyone who 
makes a private copy of her copyrighted work. How would the copyright owner even know if 
you are copying her movies on your living-room VCR, never mind when or how often you are 
doing it? Nor does today's copyright owner know when you are photocopying articles to put in 
your private library. Even if the copyright owner did know, or even if the copyist volunteered 
the information, the costs of contracting, negotiating, and transmitting funds between copyright 
owner and user might well swamp whatever benefits the copying might yield. As a result, 
copying might stop. Fair use allows the copying to occur and does so without depriving a 
copyright owner of revenues she could otherwise obtain. This is the argument advanced in 
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 26. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United 
States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1356-57 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (exhibiting concern that if photocopying licensing 
were required, this would discourage the practice of scientifically valuable photocopying), aff d 
by an equally divided coun, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam). 
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in transaction costs (brought about by the availability of apparently 
practical photocopy licensing) by decreasing the scope of fair use. 98 
Cyberspace holds out the promise of nearly costless transactions. It 
may be possible, not too long from now, for a Net-surfer to press a 
button whenever she sees something she likes,99 and thereby direct 
a computer somewhere to give her a virtually instantaneous 
copy-and, with the same speed and ease, deduct the price of a copy 
from her bank account. 
The privacy and distributional justice issues are obvious. But even 
if the computers could be trusted somehow not to tell Big Brother 
what we are all watching, and even if governmental libraries were to 
subsidize poor persons' uses of the Net, the computerization of 
culture implicates other issues. In particular, such computerization 
promises to increase drastically the number of times a market 
transaction between copyright owner and user will be practical. 
From an economic perspective, one of the primary reasons for not 
propertizing everything has been the presence of significant transac-
tion costs.100 Considering the harms we continually inflict on each 
other, and the benefits we continually confer on each other, scholars 
have often offered reciprocity as a key to understanding the shape of 
law. They typically suggest that the law should and does limit the 
right to sue to occasions when something significantly large, and 
significantly unlikely to be reciprocated, is at stake. If the law did not 
have such limits, we would go broke trying to keep track of who owes 
what to whom. 
This kind of analysis has played a strong role in both the public and 
private law of tangible property,101 torts,102 intellectual proper-
ty,103 and restitution. John Dawson's discussion of restitution is 
typical: 
Uncompensated gains are pervasive and universal; our well-being 
and survival depend on them .... Even with a bank of monster 
98. See American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. 
dismissed, 116 s. Cl. 592 (1995); see also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TIIE NATIONAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF TIIE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 82 (1995) (predicting that "[i]t may be that technological means of tracking 
transactions and licensing will lead to reduced application and scope of the fair use doctrine"). 
99. Admittedly, there is a transaction cost to the Net surfer in finding the material she wants; 
that raises separate issues and opportunities. The focus here is the decrease in the transaction 
costs after a desired product has been located. 
100. From the perspective of maximizing economic value, the shape and allocation of 
property rights depend crucially on transaction costs. See COASE, Problem of Social Cost, supra 
note 69, at 95. 
101. See Michelman, supra note 52, at 1179-83, 1255. 
102. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 548 
(1972). 
103. See, e.g., Gordon, On Owning Information, supra note 8, at 222-23, 249-51. 
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computers one could hardly estimate the consequences of dis-
covering electric light. The radius of the fallout and the number 
of beneficiaries on whom it descends must be sharply reduced 
before one could even consider tracing the fallout back to its 
source.104 
Thus, with the impracticality of transacting comes a common sense 
limitation on the requirement that we transact.105 If, however, 
transaction costs decrease markedly--on the Web or elsewhere in our 
future-will any reasons remain for limiting property rights? Should 
fair use vanish completely? 
One reason for preserving fair use has been hinted at before: The 
more we pay for, the less the sense of debt we may have toward our 
culture as a whole. We currently impose no charges for the bulk of 
the effects we levy on each other, primarily because of transaction 
costs, but with a beneficial side effect as well. Many of us feel some 
sense of connectedness to the community that both demands 
unpredictable sacrifice and gives unearned joys. Radin's focus on 
community and stability helps remind us that a sense of connectedness 
is something that should be preserved. 
Radin's approach does not mean that the market-failure model is 
of no use.106 For example, that model tells us that the market may 
be inappropriate when the copyright transaction transfers to nonpar-
ticipants significant benefits or costs ("externalities"}.107 Further, 
assets such as reputation may have strong wealth or endowment 
effects: It can be unwise to rely on the market to determine the 
highest-valued use in cases where reputation is at issue, namely cases 
involving parody and criticism. In addition, sensitivity to market 
failure suggests that values that are not easily monetized should, 
perhaps, be handled outside the market.108 
104. John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (1974). 
Note that the electric light would be patentable, but that the tracing problems are minimized by 
having patents last for no more than 20 years. 
105. For the classic statement of the way that the law responds to transaction costs by 
lessening or abrogating the usual requirement for consensual transactions, see Calabresi & 
Melamed, supra note 52, at 1106-10. Though the literature on the Cathedral article is 
voluminous, a helpful place to begin is Symposium, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability-A Twenty-Five Year Retrospective: Remaking the Simple Rules of the Cathedral, 
106 YALE L.J. 201 (1997). 
106. Also, outside of both market failure concerns and Radin's analysis, transactional 
fairness may sometimes dictate "fair use," as when a copyright owner's assertion of copyright 
control would, because of effects that the owner's behavior has already set in motion, cause a 
net harm that can be ameliorated by permitting copying. See Gordon, Property Right in Set/-
Expression, supra note 29, at 1601-06. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 196 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 
1986), exemplifies this transactional kind of fair use: Jerry Falwell was permitted to make 
photocopies of a copyrighted work that ridiculed him, in order to raise money to fight the· 
ridicule. 
107. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 26, at 1630-32. 
108. See id. (discussing nonmonetizability); see also Robert Merges, The End of Friction?: 
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Radin's focus on the human element in property law also has 
implications for liability rules.100 The biggest conundrum likely to 
face the next decade of intellectual property scholars is the increasing 
role of liability rules.110 Particularly in copyright law, the use of such 
solutions is tempting. The primary goal of copyright is to provide 
incentives for creation, while a primary danger of copyright is 
restraint on free speech. It might be imagined that liability rules are 
an ideal way to resolve these tensions: Order copyists to pay (thus 
bolstering the incentives of intellectual property owners) while 
simultaneously depriving intellectual property owners of veto rights 
(thus assuring that private censorship will be avoided). Even the 
Supreme Court is playing with liability rule solutions in the copyright 
arena.111 
However tempting liability rules may seem, they have human 
costs112 that go well beyond the traditional administrative-cost and 
Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 115, 134 (1997) ("Fair use [in the future] will revolve less around market failure, and 
more around the idea of favoring certain classes of users with a statutory privilege. In economic 
terms, the new foundation will represent a shift from emphasizing transaction costs to 
emphasizing redistribution, pure and simple."). 
109. Liability rules include both compulsory licenses set by statute and money-only remedies 
granted by courts. Even aside from liability rule issues, it is hoped that Radin will tum her 
attention increasingly to intellectual property. Many of its issues-such as the assignability or 
descendibility of the right of publicity, or the nature and putative inalienability of moral 
rights-touch on her concerns. 
110. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 52. 
111. Thus, for example, the fair use doctrine has traditionally sheltered many critical and 
parodic uses of copyrighted work. Copying involved in making a critical review or a parody is 
seen as socially valuable, and the criticism or parody is unlikely to be achievable (or objective) 
if the person criticized or parodied is given a veto right over it. If granted fair use treatment 
under this traditional approach, the critic or parodist can copy for free. But in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1995), the Supreme Court recently hinted that in future 
parody cases, even if the parodist can utilize the fair use doctrine to escape an injunction, 
perhaps the parodist will be forced to pay some kind of fee to the owner of the disparaged work. 
The Court hinted at a similar approach in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 
(1977), where it explained why a circus performer's suit for monetary relief only, against a news 
agency that broadcast his act without permission, did not violate the First Amendment. See id. 
at 578 ("Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply wants 
to be paid for it."). 
Liability rule treatment has long been a conceptual alternative to the fair use doctrine's 
traditional free ride. See, e.g., Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 26, at 1622-24 
(alternatives to fair use). But scholars have only begun to explore the implications of wholesale 
judicial willingness to substitute monetary recovery for injunctions. 
Intellectual property statutes often embody compulsory licenses. Justice Brandeis thought that 
liability rule solutions should be a legislative province. See International News Serv. v. Associated 
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 266-68 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (rejecting the majority's grant of a 
common law right in the news). 
112. Jane Ginsburg seems to recognize as much when she suggests that works of "low 
authorship" such as fact directories and computer databases should be "limited by a form of 
collective licensing," while the creators of works involving personal authorial investment such 
as novels and paintings should retain their traditional veto right. Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 339-
41. However, the audience's human needs to copy or distort are likely to be larger with respect 
to high authorship works. 
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measurement concerns voiced by Calabresi and Melamed.113 For 
example, it might change the nature of the artistic professions and the 
nature and quality of the works produced if artists lost their right to. 
control copying, and retained only a right to be paid.114 
Radin historically has been concerned with how our legal 
institutions affect human flourishing. Her primary topic is whether 
people who have rights to exclude should also be able to sell them for 
money. She argues, as discussed above, that coupling a right to 
exclude with alienability can be damaging to human self-conceptions. 
If that is so, then a fortiori our self-conceptions would be subject to 
potentially even greater dangers if we lost our rights to exclude. If a 
power to sell became the only interest that particular people could 
possess in their work, then their attitudes toward themselves and their 
work might change markedly. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the debate over the relation between law and norms, virtually 
everyone agrees that the law should be concerned with inculcating 
one attitude: a norm of respect for law.115 Copyright laws can erode 
that respect, either if inconsistent with usual norms such as 
privacy,116 or if copyright imposes duties to pay that are so extensive 
that they erode the general sense of obligation we owe to our culture 
as a whole. 
Admittedly, paying for culture is not paying for everything. The 
value of civil order is itself immense. But the more that people pay 
for, the more likely they are to overlook their remaining debt. 
Boyle and Radin enter the field of battle under the same colors. 
Both target law and economics. Both joust against overarching theory 
in general. Each argues in favor of pragmatism and against formalism, 
and each trumpets the importance of paying attention to detail and 
context. Both focus on the feedback loop between law and social 
norms.117 
113. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 52, at 1093-105. 
114. Among other things, commercialization can discourage certain valuable kinds of artistic 
endeavors, and instead encourage a less valuable kind of artistic effort. Rewards do not 
invariably elicit desirable behavior. See ALFIE KOHN, PUNISHED BY REWARDS: THE TROUBLE 
WITH GOLD STARS, INCENTIVE PLANS, A'S, PRAISE, AND OTHER BRIBES (1993). 
115. See Rosen, supra note 60, at 176. 
116. Cf. Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 235, 242-46 (1991) (arguing 
that the actual norms of artistic creation can coexist with copyright law only because artists are 
systematically ignorant about that law's actual provisions). 
117. Boyle argues that norms from authorial discourse have hurt intellectual property law, 
and Radin argues that market-oriented laws have the potential to degrade our discourse about 
human nature. 
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Most importantly, both books exhibit solicitude for the ordinary 
human's effort to make meaning out of her world. Thus, for Boyle the 
primary demon is not really "romantic authorship," but rather the 
danger that intellectual property law will come to deprive iconoclasts 
of the material needed to make new meanings. Similarly, for Radin 
the primary demon is not that babies or body parts will be sold; it is 
that the market will so come to dominate our view of the world that 
we will be deprived of the material needed to create alternative self-
definitions. 
Admittedly, the two books differ in their topics: Boyle's book 
primarily targets an intellectual property owner's power to exclude, 
while Radin targets the power to alienate that is sometimes attached 
to personal entitlements. But at bottom, both books are animated by 
an optimistic belief that qualitative human progress is achievable if we 
as a society can end our overreliance on market and property 
solutions. In the process, Boyle helps identify and debunk a myth that 
has harmfully distorted our law of information, and Radin deepens 
our understanding of how our personal abilities to flourish may 
depend in part on the shape that law gives to property. 

